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Abstract
In this article, I want to put forward the following argument: Cognitive Linguistics – after 
a long hegemony of Chomskyan formalist linguistics – has offered models of language as 
“motivated” by general and prior cognitive abilities; as such it has been able to provide 
representations of a much wider range of linguistic phenomena (both grammatical and 
lexical); however, the “human face” of Cognitive Linguistics is that of a generic human 
being rather than that of actual people: members of particular social communities in 
which languages develop through “figuration” and “articulation”. 
1. Introduction
It seems advisable to state at the beginning that the following assessment of the shift 
in linguistics from Chomsky’s formalist approach to Lakoff’s cognitive approach 
is a personal take written from the point of view of a former “fellow traveller”. 
As a student, I was duly impressed by the publication in Polish (1988) of Lakoff and 
Johnson’s manifesto of Cognitive Linguistics (CL). In the next two decades, I was 
privileged to see at close quarters how CL was expertly popularised by Tabakowska 
(1995, 2001, 2004) and applied by her with unequalled insight to Translation Studies 
(Tabakowska 1991, 1993, 2013). I was sufficiently enthusiastic about the potential of this 
approach to write a cognitivist manifesto of my own (Pawelec 1999) and embark on 
a detailed presentation of “Lakoff’s circle” as well as a critique of their contributions 
to linguistics and other fields (Pawelec 2005, 2006a). Subsequently, I recanted my 
cognitivist credo in the journal which hosted my previous apology (Pawelec 2006b) 
and offered a final critique of Lakoff in a publication commemorating the 30th an-
niversary of Metaphors we live by (Pawelec 2009a/2014).
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If I mention my cognitivist itinerary, it is in the hope that my case may have 
a more general significance. My background is that of a social philosopher inves-
tigating the importance of social practices – primarily, linguistic ones – in the 
development of humanity. Since the early 90s, I have been influenced the most 
by the work of Charles Taylor (culminating in Taylor 2016) and through him by 
the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
Gadamer, Ricoeur). If one wanted to summarize this tradition in one sentence, 
a good choice would be Gadamer’s claim (2004: 470): “Being that can be under-
stood is language”, which underlines the universality of language as the medium of 
understanding – as the very condition of having a world one can make sense of.
The necessary mediation of language (or better, “languaging”, see section 2) in the 
development of human understanding leads to the problem of origins and the role 
of metaphor. In the Romantic tradition, explored by Taylor, this role was famously 
expressed by Shelley in his A defense of poetry:
language is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the before unapprehended relations 
of things and perpetuates their apprehension until words, which represent them, 
become, through time, signs for portions or classes of thought instead of pictures 
of integral thoughts: and then, if no new poets should arise to create afresh the as-
sociations which have been thus disorganised, language will be dead to all the nobler 
purposes of human intercourse (after Richards 1965: 90–91).
Richards (1965: 92) endorses Shelley’s account and concludes that metaphor is not 
merely a linguistic ornament but “the omnipresent principle of language”. All who 
share this attitude, like myself, would easily warm up to Lakoff and Johnson’s 
(1980: 228) belief in metaphor’s centrality and their goal to offer an account of “im-
aginative rationality”: “an account of how understanding uses the primary resources 
of the imagination via metaphor and how it is possible to give experience new 
meaning and to create new realities”. Their idea that metaphor is like a new “sense” 
would be even more resonant:
It is as though the ability to comprehend experience through metaphor were a sense, 
like seeing or touching or hearing, with metaphors providing the only ways to per-
ceive and experience much of the world. Metaphor is as much a part of our function-
ing as our sense of touch, and as precious (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 239).
In the following, I propose first to elucidate some intuitions informing the “Ro-
mantic view” of language as constitutive of humanity. This account will serve 
then as a background to assess the shortcomings of the cognitive view of language 
(“mentalism”).
2. Language as constitutive
This section’s title is borrowed from Taylor (2016) and follows his account. In the 
subtitle of his latest book Taylor promises to describe “the full shape of the human 
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linguistic capacity”. Such an ambitious promise is clearly directed against alterna-
tive accounts of language – primarily, as “encoding and communicating informa-
tion” (Taylor 2016: ix) – which Taylor calls “enframing” and views as partial and 
stifling. Taylor’s task at hand is part of his more general mission to retrieve the 
sources of the human condition which have been lost from view mostly as a result 
of the modern scientific revolution (disenchantment of nature) and its ideologies 
(naturalism, reductionism, scientism). Taylor’s project is thus congruent with the 
phenomenological-hermeneutical agenda of “bracketing” the constituted, ready-
made world in order to reveal our (otherwise hidden from view) constituting, world-
shaping involvements.
The creative “work” of metaphor – invoked by Shelley – is discussed by Taylor 
first under the rubric “the figuring dimension of language”. This felicitous expression 
(conveniently related in English to “figures of speech” and “figurative language”, the 
gestaltist “figure/ground” opposition, and also, perhaps, to “figuring out” puzzles 
or riddles) generally means ‘giving shape to entities’. The role of figurative language 
is here limited to figuring (shaping) one thing in terms of another, “framing” it as 
something else. Thus, one could call “mouse” a computer device similar in function 
to “trackball” (a pedestrian label, merely pointing out the function). The new, imagi-
native name frames the device in a particular way (on the basis of a rather remote 
similarity) and brings with it (without actually spelling out) possible suggestions 
(e.g. the device is a ‘homely thing’). Such “meaning extensions” are ubiquitous in 
language because there is a social need to name new entities (inopiae causa) and, 
perhaps even more, to provide them with expressive labels (hence a staggering 
number of imaginative synonyms for existentially important things). Additionally, 
framing (whether linguistic, or pictorial) is exploited for rhetorical purposes in 
propaganda, commercials and similar ventures.
This way of “figuring” our world is certainly not just “ornamental” but it is 
a far cry from Shelley’s belief in the creative power of metaphor. What Shelley and 
other Romantics have in mind is the power to “apprehend” something – to make 
it generally accessible – for the first time. In such cases the entity in question is not 
accessible independently (like the computer device mentioned before) but is merely 
felt in an unspecified way and gets into focus as a result of apt naming (le mot juste). 
This reconfiguration of experience – analogous perhaps to a gestalt switch which 
allows one to see the background as a figure in its own right – is called by Tay-
lor “articulation”. An example is provided by Ricoeur (1967) in his discussion of 
the symbolism of evil: first as ‘defilement’ (external contamination), then as ‘sin’ 
(erring of some kind) and finally as ‘guilt’ (an internal burden weighing on one’s 
conscience). We can immediately appreciate that these terms refer to very different 
ways of experiencing evil. What remains unclear is the historical passage from one 
stage to another which must have involved much more than acts of (re)naming. 
The process of articulation as investigated by Ricoeur involves not only symbols, 
which “give rise to thought” (Ricoeur 1967: 347–357), but also, and necessarily so, 
stories (myths) depicting paradigmatic situations and scenarios which reconfigure 
everyday experience, provide “templates through which people can understand 
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their life” (Taylor 2016: 292). Narratives, according to Taylor, are irreplaceable in 
this role because they portray “defining moments” and “transitions”, thus offering 
insight which cannot be paraphrazed, reduced to a “take-home lesson”. Good sto-
ries make tangible – for the first time – the complexity of human condition in 
a particular situation. Something similar may be said about poetic articulations 
of individual experience, while philosophical articulations aspire to universal sig-
nificance (cf. Pawelec 2009b). We can now see better perhaps why the neologism 
“languaging” is apt to describe the active power of language to fix and extend the 
contours of our common worlds as opposed to the “enframing” view of language 
interpreted as a tool to express ideas or concepts.
To round off this all-too-brief presentation I want to return to Shelley’s state-
ment about the “poetic origins” of language. It is perhaps easier to see now why he 
believes that without new poets “language will be dead to all the nobler purposes 
of human intercourse” (Shelley 2004 [online]). This is because existing articula-
tions “sink in”, they are taken for granted as given, as what is habitually believed 
and done (Heidegger’s notion of Das Man, 1962: par. 27) and as a result they are 
deprived of the originary force they exerted as spiritual discoveries (defining mo-
ments and transitions in Taylor’s account). As for Shelley’s belief that language was 
a poetic invention, a creative work of genius, it seems rather dubious. There are 
many evolutionary scenarios of language genesis on offer. Despite their differ-
ences they make it abundantly clear that human individuality is an outcome of 
language, hence it cannot be assumed as its foundation. The necessary prerequisite 
of languaging is an ability of early humans to act “in unison” (Jordania 2006, 2011), 
to keep together in time (McNeill 1995), synchronizing their movements and voices 
(Mulloch, Trevarthen 2009). This conclusion is congruent with developmental 
evidence, as formulated by Vygotsky (1978: 57):
Every function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first, on the social 
level, and later, on the individual level; first, between people (interpsychological) and 
then inside the child (intrapsychological). This applies equally to voluntary atten-
tion, to logical memory, and to the formation of concepts. All the higher functions 
originate as actual relationships between individuals.
3. The cognitivist agenda?
The developmental evidence offered by Vygotsky and Trevarthen (among others) is 
especially significant because it is directly opposed to the assumption shared by first 
(Chomsky) and second (Lakoff) generation Cognitive Science, namely that language 
is primarily a mental program (“competence”) which is verbally expressed only 
subsequently (“performance”). The difference between them concerns the shape of 
this entity: whether it is a language module operating the innate system of “universal 
grammar” (Chomsky), or a general cognitive system of acquired (pre)conceptual 
structures and operations on them (Lakoff).
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Out of the two, Chomsky’s mentalism may seem not only more incredible, but 
also redundant. After all, his theory of language is formalist, attempting in its vari-
ous avatars (generative grammar, principles and parametres model, minimalist 
program) to offer a satisfactory description of linguistic forms (primarily, syntax) 
as an autonomous system. Thus, any external rationale for the existence of this sys-
tem is not strictly necessary. However, as explained by Harman (2004) to students 
and colleagues who “sometimes seem puzzled about mentalistic assumptions in 
Chomskean [sic] linguistics” it made sense for Chomsky to espouse the following 
“mentalistic speculation about language learning” in the early 60s, in the wake of 
his scathing review of Skinner’s Verbal behavior:
Suppose that the constraints needed for English grammar are not learned. Suppose that 
they are somehow innate in a child’s language faculty. Then, since the child is capable of 
acquiring any language depending on its environment, the same constraints should be 
found in the grammar of any language and should be part of universal grammar. This hy-
pothesis predicts that the study of English grammar can tell us things about French, or 
Japanese, or Turkish grammar, an empirical prediction (Harman 2004: online).
In other words, the perceived inadequacy of behaviouristic explanations of lan-
guage acquisition (“the poverty of the stimulus”) convinced Chomsky to postulate 
an innate language faculty which would underwrite generalizations of his model. 
There are at least two problems with this move. First, the rejection of empiricist 
scenarios of language acquisition (linguistic utterances viewed as stimuli) does 
not lead to linguistic nativism as the fall-back position. There is a whole range of 
options between the mind treated as “tabula rasa” and the mind innately equipped 
with a language module. Second, the “poverty of the stimulus” argument wrongly 
reduces linguistic utterances to stimuli (Deacon 1997: 84–92) and misses crucial 
elements of the social situation which make language acquisition possible, cf. Taylor 
(2016: 52ff) on the ontogenesis of language. In short, I view Chomsky’s recourse to 
mentalism as a very successful rhetorical move: it has given his formalist work on 
English syntax a universalist look and as a result provided a powerful impetus to 
similar research on other languages.
Mutatis mutandis, the same could be concluded about Lakoff and Johnson’s 
mentalism despite their all-out attack on Chomsky:
There is no Chomskyan person, for whom language is pure syntax, pure form insu-
lated from and independent of all meaning, context, perception, emotion, memory, 
attention, action, and the dynamic nature of communication. Moreover, human 
language is not a totally genetic innovation. Rather, central aspects of language 
arise evolutionarily from sensory, motor, and other neural systems that are present 
in ‘lower’ animals (Lakoff, Johnson 1999: 6).
As I pointed out in my assessment of their critique, which – on the face of it – looks 
eminently sensible (Pawelec 2007), Lakoff and Johnson misconstrue Chomsky’s posi-
tion since they disregard the division of labour between “competence” and “perfor-
mance”. Chomsky himself would be the first to admit that there is no “Chomskyan 
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person” since his theory deals with an idealized construct called “I-Language” (in-
ternal one) as opposed to “E-Language” (external one) and it is only the latter which 
involves “meaning, context, perception” and so on. As for the phylogenesis of lan-
guage, Lakoff and Johnson’s description is in my view not sufficiently removed from 
Chomsky’s account as it does not involve a socially embodied account of language 
genesis (cf. Donald 1991; Taylor 2016).
The same goes for Lakoff and Johnson’s account of the “work” of metaphor, 
as expressed in an early passage which, to the best of my knowledge, has never been 
developed: “A portion of the conceptual network of battle partially characterizes the 
concept of an argument, and the language follows suit” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 7, 
my emphasis). Language seems quite inert in this account: it merely provides labels 
for the outcomes of independent, prior and cryptic cognitive processes. There is no 
visible effort in the publications of “Lakoff’s circle” to provide social contexts which 
would help us understand how metaphors are born and “die” (in English), or rather 
“fall asleep” and “wake up” (Müller 2008). What they offer is a model of a range of 
linguistic phenomena (primarily, collocations and idioms) which has been extended 
(to cover nonce words) by Fauconnier and Turner (2002) in their theory of “blend-
ing”. Such models are useful as they can show with some clarity the outcomes of 
“figuration” in language; the work of linguistic figuration is, however, obscured by 
mentalistic rhetoric.
To justify (and properly qualify) this claim would take volumes (cf. Pawelec 
2005, 2009c for two limited attempts). In a nutshell, however, the task of understand-
ing language requires a broader perspective, encompassing its unbreakable bonds 
with “thought and reality” (to allude to the title of Whorf 1956). It is, of course, natural 
and necessary for science to abstract from the background in order to delimit a field 
of investigation. Such a move was famously made by the father of modern linguistics 
who proposed to explain language as a synchronic system of signs (langue), in oppo-
sition to the vagaries of actual linguistic utterances (parole) and diachronic change 
(Saussure 1959). In my view, the cognitivist agenda is a development of Saussure’s 
structuralism. Chomsky reformulated semiotic langue (a particular system of arbi-
trary linguistic signs) as a mental competence (the idealized universal mental capacity 
underlying language production). In both cases, the proposed area of investigation 
is autonomous, separated from parole/performance. As a result of Chomsky’s move, 
the underlying reality of language is no longer viewed as a symbolic system of op-
positions but rather as a formalized set of rules. Despite their claims to the contrary, 
Lakoff and Johnson’s approach is a version of Chomsky’s mentalism: language is an 
unconscious conceptual mechanism generating semantically interpretable output 
(cf. Pawelec 2005: 154–7). Even if their semantic mentalism, as opposed to the for-
malist variant, takes into account much of the psychological and social background 
necessary for the interpretation of linguistic units, it enlists this background as 
ready-made (the result of universal cognitive processes and particular cognitive 
models), rather than as constituted by social interaction in human history. Conse-
quently, the evolutionary and cultural processes constitutive of “language, thought 
and (human) reality” are partly lost from view.
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4. Conclusions
The shortcomings of CL, especially in the version developed in “Lakoff’s circle”, 
have been repeatedly pointed out (for instance, McLure 1993; Leezenberg 2001; 
Krzeszowski 2002; Rakova 2002; Haser 2005; Snaevarr 2009). My aim here was 
not to add (yet again) to this literature but to point out that figuration in language – 
so extensively researched by CL – is essentially social. The “human face” of linguistics 
is the face of languaging communities.
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